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The United States’ alarmingly high C-section rate and its equally alarming maternal mortality rate make it 
clear that reproductive healthcare is failing women. But it is especially failing Black women, who are today 
disproportionately exposed to these and other reproductive health risks just as they have been throughout 
history. The Michigan Journal of Gender & Law selected this Essay because it traces a direct line from early 
gynecology’s reliance on the bodies of unconsenting Black women to how medicine and the law’s failure 
to reckon with this history continues to harm Black women now. While these institutions now purport to 
embrace ethical principles like bodily autonomy and individual agency, this Essay critically examines why 
Black women must still navigate reproductive healthcare against a backdrop of both racist medical violence 
that puts their health at risk and a legal doctrine of informed consent that cannot realistically protect them.
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MEDICAL VIOLENCE, OBSTETRIC RACISM, AND THE 
LIMITS OF INFORMED CONSENT FOR BLACK WOMEN
Colleen Campbell*
This Essay critically examines how medicine actively engages in the reproductive 
subordination of Black women. In obstetrics, particularly, Black women must 
contend with both gender and race subordination. Early American gynecology 
treated Black women as expendable clinical material for its institutional needs. This
medical violence was animated by biological racism and the legal and economic 
exigencies of the antebellum era. Medical racism continues to animate Black 
women’s navigation of and their dehumanization within obstetrics. Today, the 
racial disparities in cesarean sections illustrate that Black women are simultaneously 
overmedicalized and medically neglected—an extension of historical medical practices 
rooted in the logic of biological race. Though the principle of informed consent 
traditionally protects the rights of autonomy, bodily integrity, and well-being,
medicine nevertheless routinely subjects Black women to medically unnecessary 
procedures. This Essay adopts the framework of obstetric racism to analyze Black 
women’s overmedicalization as a site of reproductive subordination. It thus offers a 
critical interdisciplinary and intersectional lens to broader conversations on race in 
reproduction and maternal health.
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The issue of maternal health disparities has received increased public 
attention since Serena Williams shared her nearly fatal birth story.1 A day 
after giving birth to her daughter via C-section, Williams had trouble 
breathing.2 With her history of embolisms, Williams lives in fear of blood 
clots, and assumed she was having another pulmonary embolism.3 When 
she alerted a nurse and asked for a CT scan and a blood thinner, the 
nurse assumed she was confused because of her pain medicine.4
Instead, the doctor performed an ultrasound—also known as a
Doppler—of her legs.5 “I was like, a Doppler? I told you, I need a CT 
scan and a heparin drip.”6 Williams again insisted she was having an em-
bolism.7 When the ultrasound revealed nothing, she eventually under-
went a CT scan, which showed several small blood clots in her lungs.8
1. Rob Haskell, Serena Williams on Motherhood, Marriage, and Making Her Comeback,
VOGUE (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.vogue.com/article/serena-williams-vogue-cover-
interview-february-2018 [https://perma.cc/LS3J-6598].
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also Jennifer Drysdale, Serena Williams Cries over Near-Death Experience After 
Giving Birth in ‘Being Serena,’ ENT. TONIGHT (May 9, 2018), https://www.etonline.com
/serena-williams-cries-over-near-death-experience-after-giving-birth-in-being-serena-
101980 [https://perma.cc/N88N-XZV6].
4. Haskell, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Drysdale, supra note 3.
8. Haskell, supra note 1.
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She was immediately put on the heparin drip, which saved her life.9 “I 
was like, listen to Dr. Williams!”10
Though Williams lived to tell her story, her experience sheds light 
on why Black women navigate pregnancy as potentially deadly terrain—
because of medical racism and obstetric violence. For instance, in obstet-
rics, the vast power differentiation between providers and patients often 
renders informed consent a legal fiction. Informed consent presumes not 
only the ability to grant consent, but the ability to engage in informed 
refusal.11 Otherwise put, it contemplates the ability to freely express a dif-
ferent opinion than the provider. This is crucial because women know 
their bodies most intimately.12 Nevertheless, women often encounter au-
thoritarian physicians unwilling to consider their expertise on their own 
bodies, which inhibits them from challenging providers.13 Moreover, 
those who do challenge medical authority are often silenced, dismissed,
or ignored.14 For example, although Williams engaged in informed refusal
by asserting her own bodily expertise, she still found herself dismissed.
Not only does challenging medical authority require considerable 
personal capacity to be an agent of one’s own medical treatment, the 
medical system also places an unreasonable burden on women to be both 
advocates and patients when they are most vulnerable: in childbirth. For 
Black women, the consequences of this expectation can be deadly. In ad-
dition to the gendered violence in obstetrics, medical racism subjects Black 
women to medical exploitation and dehumanization. Theories of biolog-
ical race, in particular, continue to shape physician treatment recommen-




11. See Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (“The law 
protects [a patient’s] right to make her own decision to accept or reject treatment, wheth-
er that decision is wise or unwise.”). For a social justice critique of informed consent and 
liberal autonomy bioethics, see Ruha Benjamin, Informed Refusal: Toward a Justice-Based 
Bioethics, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 967 (2016).
12. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 568 (1993) 
(noting judicial acceptance of medical staff data as legitimate, but that the “more ‘contex-
tualized’ knowledge conveyed by laboring women, such as conclusions based on accounts 
of their previous labors, was ‘easily dismissed as personal, subjective, idiosyncratic . . . in a 
word, unscientific’”).
13. Dominick L. Frosch, Suepattra G. May, Katharine A.S. Rendle, Caroline Tietbohl
& Glyn Elwyn, Authoritarian Physicians and Patients’ Fear of Being Labeled “Difficult” Among 
Key Obstacles to Shared Decision Making, 31 HEALTH AFFS. 1030, 1033 (2012).
14. See Ehrenreich, supra note 12, at 551-52 (describing the treatment of women of 
color, including dismissal and disparagement, as a “violent effort at subjugation” because 
of their race and gender).
15. See infra Part II. 
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This Essay thus adopts a critical race analysis of medicine. It illus-
trates how medical racism and institutional practices expose Black women 
to unnecessary and riskier surgical interventions. In obstetrics particularly,
Black women are simultaneously overmedicalized and medically neglect-
ed, a paradigm that is an extension of historical medical practices and 
rooted in the logic of biological race.16 This Essay argues that medicine, 
through overmedicalization, undermines Black women's reproductive 
agency. Moreover, despite the protections guaranteed by law, the doc-
trine of informed consent cannot protect Black women from routinized 
medical exploitation. In making this argument, this Essay also counters 
the hegemonic biological construction of Black women’s bodies as a site 
of pathology, and instead centers the pathologies of racism and medical 
violence in the discourse on reproductive health.
The research literature amply documents the history of Black wom-
en’s medical exploitation. As property, enslaved women could not legally 
consent to or refuse the violence of white male physicians. Thus, early 
gynecology particularly thrived on the exploitation of Black women. Part 
I explores this long history of medical violence, which continued into the 
twentieth century in the form of sterilization abuse and coercive experi-
mental birth control therapies.
Physicians today still construe Black bodies through the prism of bi-
ological race and, as a result, as perpetually high-risk bodies. Biological 
race thus operates as both a cause of and a perverse justification for Black 
women’s overmedicalization and increased exposure to invasive risk 
management techniques. Part II examines the racial disparities in C-
section rates to demonstrate that Black women’s disparate exposure to the 
surgical scalpel is partly driven by non-medical risk factors and a host of 
other institutional forces.17
A key critique of the doctrine of informed consent is that it empha-
sizes individual agency and decision-making. This formal liberal concep-
tion of autonomy invariably obscures medical violence against vulnerable 
communities.18 Furthermore, it presumes that medical decision-making 
occurs within a vacuum, unencumbered by systems of power and ine-
quality.19 Part III interrogates the doctrine’s failure to militate against rac-
16. See generally HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK 
HISTORY OF MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL 
TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2006) (examining the long history of medical experimentation 
on African Americans).
17. Marian F. MacDorman, Fay Menacker & Eugene Declercq, Cesarean Birth in the 
United States: Epidemiology, Trends, and Outcomes, 35 CLINICAL PERINATOLOGY 293, 293
(2008) [hereinafter MacDorman et al., Cesarean Birth].
18. Benjamin, supra note 11, at 978.
19. Id. (describing the need for cultural humility to redress power imbalances and pa-
ternalism in the patient-physician relationship); see also Carolyn Johnson & Phil Drechsler,
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ism’s continued impact on Black women’s navigation of obstetrics care. 
Using the frameworks of obstetric racism20 and dehumanization, it exam-
ines the critical failure of the law to protect Black women from over-
medicalization and medical violence.
I. History of Medical Exploitation
A. Antebellum Reproductive Politics
Slavery institutionalized Black women’s loss of bodily and repro-
ductive autonomy.21 Professor Dorothy Roberts explains that slavery re-
lied on “the dehumanization of Africans on the basis of race and the con-
trol of women’s sexuality and reproduction.”22 Early colonial statutes, for 
example, attempted to enlarge the slave labor pool through the use of 
Black women’s bodies.23 Legislatures established the legal doctrine of par-
tus sequitur ventrem, which guaranteed that Black women’s children inher-
ited the status of their mother.24 This contravened the common law prin-
ciple that citizenship status was based on patrilineal descent.25 The law 
thus ensured that Black women’s children were considered slaves and le-
gal property even if they were born to white slave owners.26
Antebellum laws such as these enforced Black women’s essential 
functions within slavery as reproductive and productive labor. Enslaved
women were thus “bred” no differently from domesticated animals.27 For 
example, some masters employed “special breeding techniques” to pro-
After His Wife Died, Man Pushing to Change Laws to Protect More Women from Pregnancy-
Related Deaths, NBC L.A. (July 16, 2020), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/investigations
/wife-died-giving-birth-change-laws-to-protect-more-women-pregnancy-related-deaths
/2395401/ [https://perma.cc/RUT9-368T] (noting how his race and gender filtered his 
ability to advocate for his wife, Kira Johnson’s husband stated, “if I lost my temper if I 
yelled, if I slammed my fist on the nurse or on the nurses station that is as an African-
American man I would be seen as a threat”). 
20. The term “obstetric racism” was coined by Dána-Ain Davis. Dána-Ain Davis, Ob-
stetric Racism: The Racial Politics of Pregnancy, Labor, and Birthing, 38 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY 560, 561 (2019) [hereinafter Davis, Obstetric Racism].
21. DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND 
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 23 (Vintage Books 1st ed. 1999).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Camille A. Nelson, American Husbandry: Legal Norms Impacting the Production of 
(Re)Productivity, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 18-19 (2007).      
25. Id. (“The notion that legal status was inherited from the mother directly contra-
dicted traditional English law, but was consistent with the laws governing animal hus-
bandry and the rearing of livestock.”).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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duce lighter-skinned women who were more valued as sexual partners.28
Moreover, pregnant enslaved women and those with infant children 
were forced to perform productive agricultural work without reprieve 
from harsh labor conditions.29 Some Black women resisted these condi-
tions, however, by aborting their babies, choosing not to give birth under 
these conditions.30
Ideological constructs about their sexuality and reproduction were
used to justify Black women’s exploitation.31 Sociologist Patricia Hill Col-
lins coined the term “controlling images” to describe the hegemonic ide-
as used to legitimize violence against Black women.32 In particular, the 
jezebel archetype depicts Black women as hypersexual beings who want 
and deserve sexual attention.33 This ideological construct also justified 
masters’ unfettered sexual access to enslaved women’s bodies.34
But sexual violence against Black women has never been merely a 
gendered phenomenon; it was also a form of racial violence.35 According 
to Kimberlé Crenshaw, who developed the framework of intersectionali-
ty, Black women’s systematic sexual exploitation was a form of racial 
subordination as well.36 Therefore, “[w]hen Black women were raped by 
white males, they were being raped not as women generally, but as Black 
women specifically.”37 This is key to understanding Black women’s inter-
sectional reproductive domination.
Because Black women’s sexual exploitation satisfied America’s eco-
nomic needs and preserved its racial hierarchy,38 “[t]heir femaleness made 
them sexually vulnerable to racist domination, while their Blackness ef-
28. Ehrenreich, supra note 12, at 514-15.
29. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS  9-10 (Vintage Books 1st ed. 1983).
30. Id. at 171.
31. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 5 (Routledge 2d ed. 2000).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 81 (“Jezebel’s function was to relegate all Black women to the category of 
sexually aggressive women, thus providing a powerful rationale for the widespread sexual 
assaults by [w]hite men typically reported by Black slave women. Jezebel served yet an-
other function. If Black slave women could be portrayed as having excessive sexual appe-
tites, then increased fertility should be the expected outcome.”).
34. Id.
35. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 139, 158-59 (1989); see also Osagie K. Obasogie, Anything But a Hypocrite: Interactional 
Musings on Race, Colorblindness, and the Redemption of Strom Thurmond, 18 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 451, 482 (2006).
36. Crenshaw, supra note 35, at 158.
37. Id.
38. Ehrenreich, supra note 12, at 514-15.
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fectively denied them any protection.”39 The damaging stereotypes 
against Black women—as presumptively promiscuous, hypersexual, dys-
functional, and disorderly—therefore justified the systematic sexual vio-
lence.40 This pervasive violence against Black women by white men was 
replicated in medicine.41
B. Early American Gynecology
As legal property, enslaved women could neither consent to nor re-
fuse the imposition of white men on their bodies. While the law thus
created a permissive legal environment for Black women’s medical ex-
ploitation, the logic of biological race fueled this dehumanization, natu-
ralizing that exploitation in order to advance the medical field.42 History 
of medicine scholar Rana Hogarth explains that slave hospitals in this era 
existed to facilitate the production of biomedical knowledge about 
Blackness and normalize the idea that Black bodies were physiologically
distinct—and fundamentally inferior.43 More specifically, medicine con-
structed Black bodies as medical “super bodies” and impervious to pain.44
For example, as legal scholar Khiara Bridges observes, it was widely be-
lieved that Black women possessed “obstetrical hardiness,” or a “primi-
tive pelvis.”45
It was common practice to test new therapies on Black bodies be-
fore applying them to white bodies46 and slaves were particularly suscep-
39. Crenshaw, supra note 35, at 158-59.
40. COLLINS, supra note 31.
41. DEIRDRE COOPER OWENS, MEDICAL BONDAGE: RACE, GENDER, AND THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN GYNECOLOGY 7 (2018).
42. Id.; see generally Todd L. Savitt, The Use of Blacks for Medical Experimentation and 
Demonstration in the Old South, 48 J. S. HIST. 331, 331-48 (1982); Colleen Campbell, Ra-
cial Inclusivity in COVID-19 Vaccine Trials, PETRIE-FLOM CTR.: BILL OF HEALTH BLOG 
(Sept. 22, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/22/racial-inclusivity-
covid19-vaccine-trials/ [https://perma.cc/MTF4-47DV]; RANA A. HOGARTH,
MEDICALIZING BLACKNESS: MAKING RACIAL DIFFERENCE IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD
(2017).
43. HOGARTH, supra note 42, at 163; see generally OWENS, supra note 41 (discussing this 
normalization).
44. OWENS, supra note 41, at 7; KHIARA BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE: AN
ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION 117-18 (2011).
45. BRIDGES, supra note 44, at 117-18.
46. Savitt, supra note 42, at 341 (“When new techniques or treatments required exper-
imentation doctors tested them on readily available and legally silent slave or free black 
patients.”).
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tible to exploitation because of their lack of legal protection.47 Black bod-
ies therefore “found their way to dissecting tables, operating amphithea-
ters, classroom or bedside demonstrations, and experimental facilities.”48
As property, they could not legally give consent to their bodies. But even 
if they could conceivably consent legally, without the right to refuse, in-
formed consent was meaningless.49 Slaves therefore became prime fodder 
for medical schools and physicians, who capitalized on their legal and po-
litical vulnerability.
Death was no respite from these indignities either, as medical stu-
dents often employed professional ‘resurrectionists’ to raid graves for ana-
tomical material.50 They did so with the approval of their institutions, 
both in the North and South.51 In fact, dead slaves were especially covet-
ed by medical schools; one flyer proclaimed the local slave population 
“furnish[ed] ample materials for clinical instruction.”52
The bourgeoning American medical profession “needed bodies to 
advance the field and to recognize formal medicine as legitimate.”53 Gy-
necology particularly needed to assert its dominance over a previously 
feminized practice that had been dominated by midwives and Indigenous 
healers, especially in the Black community.54 The development of surgi-
cal expertise through “[p]ioneering gynecological surgical procedures, 
many of which were initially performed on enslaved women and later on 
poor immigrant women” ultimately facilitated the field’s “rapid ad-
vancement.”55
It is now well known that James Marion Sims, considered the “fa-
ther of modern gynecology,”56 developed his surgical procedure to repair 
47. Id. at 332, 337. “Blacks were considered more available and more accessible in this 
white-dominated society: they were rendered physically visible by their skin color but 
were legally invisible because of their slave status.” Id. at 332.
48. Id. at 331.
49. See generally Benjamin, supra note 11.
50. Savitt, supra note 42, at 337.
51. Ivy Wang, A Grave Offense, THE NEW J., Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.thenewjournal
atyale.com/2005/11/a-grave-offense/ [https://perma.cc/G6Z6-P7YJ] (describing these
practices at Yale Medical School).
52. RANDI HUTTER EPSTEIN, GET ME OUT: A HISTORY OF CHILDBIRTH FROM THE 
GARDEN OF EDEN TO THE SPERM BANK 41 (illustrated ed. 2011) (describing medical 
treatment for slaves advertised as health care as “dubious treatment under the direction of 
inexperienced medical students”).
53. OWENS, supra note 41, at 11; KRISTEN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
MOTHERHOOD 17 (2008).
54. OWENS, supra note 41, at 5; LUKER, supra note 53, at 17.
55. OWENS, supra note 41, at 5.
56. E.g., Durrenda Ojanuga, The Medical Ethics of the ‘Father of Gynaecology’, Dr J Mari-
on Sims, 19 J. MED. ETHICS 28 (1993).
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vesico-vaginal fistula by experimenting on enslaved women.57 This tech-
nique solidified his international reputation and that of the profession.58
Betsey Harris, Anarcha Westcott, and Lucy Zimmerman were all identi-
fied as research subjects at his facility in Alabama.59 He performed multi-
ple surgeries on these women—and many unnamed others—between 
1845 and 1849 when he eventually perfected his technique.     60
Although Victorian sensibilities at the time meant it was generally 
frowned upon for white women to be exposed to the opposite sex, med-
ical professionals had no issue visiting the surgical theatre to watch Sims’s
surgeries.61 Consider Lucy’s surgery: While she was positioned on her 
hands and knees, twelve doctors gazed upon her exposed body, watching
as she endured agonizing surgery for an hour.62 Black women’s bodies at 
once satiated medicine’s institutional needs as well as the male medical 
gaze.
It is plausible that Sims may have actually caused Anarcha’s fistula.63
Anarcha was in labor for thirty-six hours with a slave midwife when Sims 
was called to tend to her birth.64 Despite having minimal experience in 
instrumental delivery, Sims nevertheless delivered Anarcha’s baby with 
forceps.65 With only a year and a half of medical training, he had lost two 
patients and confessed he “had no more idea of what to do than if I had 
57. This severe complication of obstructed childbirth results when pushing creates a 
hole between the vagina and bladder or bowel, and was common in the nineteenth cen-
tury. OWENS, supra note 41, at 36 (explaining that Sims entered the gynecology field be-
cause of the “plethora of reproductive ailments” women faced at the time). For enslaved
women, this condition rendered them useless to masters as both reproductive and produc-
tive labor. Id.
58. See MICHELE GOODWIN, POLICING THE WOMB: INVISIBLE WOMEN AND THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD 53 (2020) (“His innovations earned him a statute 
in New York’s famed Central Park. Only recently has it been removed.”).
59. OWENS, supra note 41, at 36; WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 65-66; see also Shan-
kar Vedentam, Maggie Penman, Jennifer Schmidt, Tara Boyle, Rhaina Cohen & Chloe 
Connelly, Remembering Anarcha, Lucy, and Betsey: The Mothers of Modern Gynecology, NPR:
HIDDENBRAIN PODCAST (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/02/07/513764158
/remembering-anarcha-lucy-and-betsey-the-mothers-of-modern-gynecology [hereinafter 
Vedentam et al.] (Professor Vanessa Gamble suggesting the phrase “Mothers of Modern 
Gynecology” as a means of reframing these women as not mere victims of medicine).
60. Nelson, supra note 24, at 28-31.
61. WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 64; id. at 24 (“Victorian norms of prudery and 
decency were inapplicable to slave women and girls and would not serve to protect 
them.”).
62. Ojanuga, supra note 56, at 29.
63. WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 64-65.
64. Id. at 63.
65. Nelson, supra note 24, at 32. Forceps had emerged as one of the early tools used to 
medicalize obstetrics. Richard Johanson, Mary Newburn & Alison Macfarlane, Has the 
Medicalisation of Childbirth Gone Too Far?, 324 BRITISH MED. J. 892, 892 (2002).
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never studied medicine.”66 Medical ethicist Harriet Washington therefore 
speculates that, in addition to her age and malnutrition, Anarcha’s fistula 
may have resulted from Sims’s lack of technical proficiency in forceps de-
livery.67
Sims also intentionally depicted the women in a manner that capi-
talized on racist tropes in order to legitimize his experiments. For exam-
ple, he described them as submitting to the operations “not only cheer-
fully but with thanks.”68 This absurd intimation that these women
plausibly consented, or possessed a minutiae of medical agency in the or-
deal, strains credulity at best.69 “Informed consent did not exist for slave 
patients.”70 They were certainly not free medical agents.
Sims exploited another racist belief—that Black Americans did not 
feel pain the same way whites did71—when he operated on these women 
without anesthesia, despite its availability at the time.72 This fraught at-
tempt to obscure the suffering of slave women is further belied by Sims’s
own accounts: “Lucy’s agony was extreme,” he admitted: “She was pros-
trated and I thought that she was going to die.”73 It was months before 
Lucy recovered entirely from the effects of the operation.74 Despite 
promulgating sanguine images of consenting research subjects, Sims’s 
own assertions betrayed him.
Finally, while Sims depicted himself as a savior to the wider medical 
community, he did not provide reparative therapy to all of the women
on whom he operated. According to Harriet Washington, it was Sims’s
former assistant who actually closed some of the women’s fistulas after 
Sims left the Alabama facility.75 Any ethical justification Sims offered 
based on the therapeutic value of these surgeries was undermined by this 
fact alone.
These early experimental surgeries marked Black women’s bodies as 
expendable clinical material for medicine. Enslaved women rarely bene-
66. WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 61.
67. Id. at 64. Additionally, Sims’s medical assistant claimed Sims created a fistula while 
removing bladder stones from a nine-year-old enslaved girl. Id. at 67.
68. J. Marion Sims, Two Cases of Vesico-Vaginal Fistula Cured, 5 N.Y. MED. GAZETTE &
J. HEALTH 1, 1 (1854).
69. Nelson, supra note 24, at 32.
70. OWENS, supra note 41, at 108.
71. Vedentam et al., supra note 59.
72. WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 65.
73. Id.; see also Ojanuga, supra note 56, at 29 (describing how Lucy “became extremely 
ill with fever resulting from blood-poisoning” after surgery and nearly died due to Sims’s
experimental use of a sponge to drain urine away from the bladder).
74. J. MARION SIMS & H. MARION-SIMS, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 239 (H. Marion-
Sims ed., 1884).
75. WASHINGTON, supra note 16, at 67.
WINTER 2021] The Limits of Informed Consent 57
fited from the therapies that were developed on their bodies. Instead, 
medicine relied on the logic of biological race and a legal environment 
stripping them of their agency to exploit them. In post-slavery America, 
medical violence against Black women persisted well into the twentieth
century, with gynecology continuing to play a key role.
C. Sterilization Abuse
The twentieth century witnessed continued gynecological abuse in 
the form of mass sterilizations of Black women and other women of col-
or.76 Though the early twentieth century saw sterilization institutionalized 
as part of the eugenics movement, in the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury, state family planning programs became weaponized as a source of
anti-natalist reproductive policy against poor women of color.77 Political 
discourse amplified the stigmatization of Black and Brown women and 
constructed them in biologized terms as hyper-fertile bodies that drained 
the state’s resources.78 Similarly, public figures cast Black women as in-
herently bad mothers whose children constituted “an embryonic ‘crimi-
nal class.’”79
Relf v. Weinberger exposed nationwide sterilization abuses and wide-
spread clinical experimentation on Black bodies and poor people by gov-
ernment-funded clinics.80 The family planning clinic in the Relf case ad-
ministered the then-experimental birth control therapy Depo Provera on 
young women and children in public housing.81 The clinic began its un-
solicited administration of the therapy to Katie Relf (17) without her 
parents’ consent shortly after the Relfs moved to public housing; eventu-
76. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 21 (examining the compulsory sterilizations and 
reproductive subordination of Black women).
77. Id.
78. See generally REBECCA M. KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION AND 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 1950-1980 (Rima D. Apple & Janet Golden eds., 
2011) (examining the compulsory sterilizations of poor women in the post-eugenics era).
79. Khiara M. Bridges, Quasi-Colonial Bodies: An Analysis of the Reproductive Lives of 
Poor Black and Racially Subjugated Women, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 609, 610-11 (2009) 
(arguing that the “problematization of poor Black women’s fertility . . . ought to be un-
derstood as a form of contempt for Black women’s reproductive rights”); see also DANIEL 
P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965).
80. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 565 F.2d 
722 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
81. The facts from the case are taken from the Civil Action Complaint at 5, 8-10, Relf 
v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (July 17, 1973) (No. 73-1557) [hereinafter Com-
plaint], https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-justice/case-docket/relf-v-weinberger [https://
perma.cc/Q6SH-MW6W].
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ally it targeted the younger Relf siblings, Mary Alice (12) and Minnie 
(14)—one of whom was mentally disabled—for the same drug.82
In June of 1973, a family planning nurse picked up Mrs. Relf and 
the two younger Relf sisters and brought them to a hospital.83 Mrs. Relf 
was told the children would be administered the same shots they had 
been receiving and asked to put her “mark” on a consent form before 
being escorted home.84 Only later did Mrs. Relf, who could not read or 
write, learn she had consented to surgical sterilization.85 Fourteen-year-
old Minnie was asked to sign a consent form stating she was twenty-one 
years old and consented to the same procedure.86 She too did not under-
stand what she was signing and never spoke to the doctor before she was 
surgically sterilized.87
Relf drew national attention to the widespread sterilizations across 
the U.S., as an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 poor persons were sterilized 
annually under federally funded programs.88 The National Welfare Rights 
Organization brought a class action lawsuit challenging the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare’s (HEW) authorization to sterilize per-
sons “incompetent under state law to consent . . . because of minority or 
mental deficiency.”89
Several key principles informed the court’s decision that HEW 
could not legally authorize the sterilizations of minors and disabled per-
sons.90 An examination of these principles, however, illustrates the stark 
discrepancy between the law and the medical experiences of poor and 
Black women. 
First, the court noted that informed consent “clearly precludes the 
existence of coercion or force.”91 Yet, poor Black women, especially 
those relying on public assistance or a state health care policy, were often 
82. See Complaint, supra note 81, at 8 (“[T]he agency sought out the Relf children as 
good experimental subjects for their family planning program.”).
83. Id. at 8-9.




88. Relf, 372 F. Supp. at 1199. These numbers exceed the over 60,000 sterilizations 
carried out under eugenic sterilization statutes. Alexandra Minna Stern, Sterilized in the 
Name of Public Health: Race, Immigration, and Reproductive Control in Modern California, 95
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1128, 1128 (2005).
89. Id., 372 F. Supp. at 1201.
90. Id., 372 F. Supp. at 1204-05. As a result of this case, there are now more stringent 
consent procedures to protect persons relying on state family planning services, including 
voluntary sterilization. Id. For example, it is now mandatory that individuals seeking steri-
lization are orally informed that no federal benefits can be withdrawn because of a refusal 
to consent to sterilization. Id.
91. Id., 372 F. Supp. at 1202.
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pressured to be sterilized under the threat of losing their state benefits.92
Poor pregnant women commonly encountered explicit threats of reprisal 
by state and even private medical providers for refusing to be sterilized.93
Second, the Relf court explained that consent requires the “volun-
tary, knowing and uncoerced consent of” competent individuals.94 This
in turn requires that individuals have access to adequate information that 
can facilitate their appreciation of the significance of a medical decision.  
Some poor women could not meaningfully provide consent, however, as 
the intentionally deceptive manner in which medical providers procured 
Mrs. Relf’s consent illustrates. Given her limited literacy, her consent 
certainly did not meet this standard. The Relf court also noted it was a 
“universal common law and statutory rule that minors and mental in-
competents cannot consent to medical operations.”95 As such, the Relf 
sisters and others targeted for sterilization could not have legally consent-
ed to the procedure.
Sterilization abuse emanated in part from the eugenic philosophy 
that some bodies and reproduction are more expendable than others.
That logic confirmed that racist medical violence against Black women 
continued throughout the twentieth century. The state engaged in sys-
tematic medical neglect and deployed sterilization to discipline poor 
Black women, a practice that began in the antebellum era.96 Indeed, 
many state actors, including individual social workers and medical pro-
viders, subscribed to the dominant political images of Black mothers as 
92. See Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1975). Eighteen-year-old Nial Ruth 
Cox was sterilized under North Carolina’s eugenic sterilization statute. Id. Her mother, a 
recipient of public assistance, consented to Cox’s sterilization after a social worker threat-
ened to strike the family from the welfare roll. Id. North Carolina authorized eugenic
sterilizations well into the latter part of the twentieth century. Angela Davis, The Historical 
Context: Racism, Birth Control and Reproductive Rights, 4 RACE, POVERTY & ENV’T 21, 22 
(1993). While the stated purpose of these operations was to prevent reproduction by
“mentally deficient persons,” about 5,000 of the 7,686 persons who were sterilized were 
Black women. Id.
93. See Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609, 611 (4th Cir. 1977). In this case, Virgil Walk-
er sued her obstetrician for coercing her into a sterilization procedure because she had 
multiple children and received public assistance. Id. At trial, he admitted this was his poli-
cy and that he dismissed patients, who often had no other access to an obstetrician, who 
refused. Id.; see also 3 Carolina Doctors Are Under Inquiry in Sterilization of Welfare Mothers,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1973, at 30. 
94. Relf, 372 F. Supp. at 1201-02.
95. Id., 372 F. Supp. at 1202.
96. See ALONDRA NELSON, BODY AND SOUL: THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE 
FIGHT AGAINST MEDICAL DISCRIMINATION 132-33 (2011). For a general discussion on 
how Medicaid is still an instrument for enacting control over poor women’s lives by de-
priving poor mothers of their right to privacy and autonomy, see BRIDGES, supra note 44.
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the dregs of the state.97 This stigmatization also materialized in private 
medical settings, where a lack of meaningful choice of providers often 
precluded poor Black women from fully exercising their reproductive 
agency.98
Moreover, despite the growing twentieth century embrace of bio-
ethical articulations of patients’ right to self-determination, the protec-
tions of principles like informed consent eluded Black women. Physi-
cians—in concert with state actors—habitually threatened non-compliant 
women with dismissal when they refused sterilization.99 Private medical 
spaces therefore effaced Black women’s bodily and reproductive agency 
and legitimized their dehumanization.
The next Part centers overmedicalization in obstetrics to illustrate 
how medicine remains a site of profound biomedical racialization and 
power differentiation. This, in turn, sheds light on the continuity of 
medical violence against Black women enabled by the failure of en-
shrined bioethical principles to protect them.
II. Racism, Not Race, as Risk Factor
The overmedicalization of Black women in obstetrics is a continua-
tion of a long history of medical violence that impedes Black women’s 
reproductive autonomy. This overmedicalization results, in part, from the 
presumption that Black bodies are inherently more at risk for adverse 
health outcomes and from physician bias. This Part considers disparities 
in cesarean sections, which are implicated in negative reproductive health 
outcomes, to examine the consequences of this racialization.100
This Part does not reduce Black women’s maternal health outcomes 
to overmedicalization. Independent of the disparities in surgical interven-
tions, there are underlying disparities in health that are socially deter-
mined. Indeed, these underlying health conditions may increase the need 
for C-sections. Yet as this Part will illustrate, Black women’s overmedi-
calization is not commensurate with or merely reflective of underlying 
health profiles. Black women’s disparate exposure to medically unneces-
sary high-risk surgical interventions constitutes an independent health risk 
factor that must be centered in reproductive health discourses.
97. See generally, e.g., Walker, 560 F.2d 609; Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 
1975).
98. See generally, e.g., Walker, 560 F.2d 609; Cox, 529 F.2d 47.
99. E.g., Walker, 560 F.2d 609.
100. Vanessa L. Jacoby, Victor Y. Fujimoto, Linda C. Giudice, Miriam Kuppermann & 
A. Eugene Washington, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Benign Gynecologic Conditions and 
Associated Surgeries, 202 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 514, 514-21 (2010).
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While C-sections are sometimes medically necessary and potentially 
lifesaving, a C-section is a major surgery that poses greater fetal and ma-
ternal health risks than vaginal birth.101 In fact, C-sections are associated 
with extensive adverse perinatal and neonatal outcomes.102 For this rea-
son, the World Health Organization states “[t]here is no justification for 
any region to have a rate higher than 10-15%.”103 At over 30%,104 the C-
section rate in the U.S. is generally concerning from a public health 
standpoint.
C-sections are also the most commonly performed surgical proce-
dure in the U.S.,105 which sees a comparatively high maternal morbidity 
and mortality rate vis-à-vis its wealthier counterparts.106 One of the many 
causes for the high C-section rate is physician pressure to undergo the 
surgery. Physicians routinely coerce women into having medical inter-
ventions such as labor induction and C-sections.107 Additionally, the con-
stant specter of malpractice liability;108 widespread bans on vaginal birth 
after C-section (VBAC);109 variation in hospital practices;110 and subjec-
tive, as opposed to objective, clinical indications are all identified as causal 
101. Katy Backes Kozhimannil, Michael R. Law & Beth A. Virnig, Cesarean Delivery 
Rates Vary Tenfold Among US Hospitals; Reducing Variation May Address Quality and Cost 
Issues, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 527, 527 (2013) [hereinafter Kozhimannil et al.]; MacDorman et 
al., Cesarean Birth, supra note 17.
102. Darios Getahun, Daniel Strickland, Jean M. Lawrence, Michael J. Fassett, Corinna 
Koebnick & Steven J. Jacobsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Trends in Primary Cesare-
an Delivery Based on Indications, 201 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 422.e1, 422.e6 
(2009) [hereinafter Getahun et al.].
103. World Health Org., Appropriate Technology for Birth, 326 LANCET 436, 437 (1985).
104. Michelle K. Osterman & Joyce A. Martin, Trends in Low-Risk Cesarean Delivery in 
the United States, 1990-2013, NAT’L VITAL STATS. REP. 1-2 (Nov. 5, 2014).
105. MacDorman et al., Cesarean Birth, supra note 17, at 293.
106. Marian F. MacDorman, Eugene Declercq, Howard Cabral & Christine Morton, 
Recent Increases in the U.S. Maternal Mortality Rate: Disentangling Trends from Measurement 
Issues, 128 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 447, 447, 453 (2016) [hereinafter Mac-
Dorman et al., Recent Increases] (“Despite the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goal for a 75% reduction in maternal mortality by 2015, the estimated maternal mortality 
rate for the U.S. increased from 2000 to 2014; the international trend was in the opposite 
direction.”).
107. Judy Jou, Katy B, Kozhimannil, Pamela Jo Johnson & Carol Sakala, Patient-
Perceived Pressure from Clinicians for Labor Induction and Cesarean Delivery: A Population-Based 
Survey of U.S. Women, 50 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 961, 971 (2015).
108. See generally THERESA MORRIS, CUT IT OUT: THE C-SECTION EPIDEMIC IN 
AMERICA (2013) (examining the role of the malpractice system in high rates of C-
sections).
109. Elizabeth Kukura, Choice in Birth: Preserving Access to VBAC, 114 PENN ST. L.
REV. 955, 971 (2010) (discussing the impact of widespread VBAC bans on increased risk 
of medical interventions such as C-sections). 
110. Kozhimannil et al., supra note 101, at 531.
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mechanisms in the excessive rates of C-sections.111 In other words, non-
obstetric risk factors account for much of the general rise in overmedical-
ized births.112
For example, one study concluded that recent “increases in primary 
cesareans in cases of ‘no indicated risk’ have been more rapid than in the 
overall population and seem to be the result of changes in obstetric prac-
tices rather than changes in the medical risk profile or ‘maternal re-
quest.’”113 Plainly put, it is not that mothers have become unhealthier 
over the years and are in greater need of C-sections, nor can the rates be 
explained by a greater patient preference for the procedure. If the high 
rates of C-sections are not medically indicated, then, they constitute an 
independent increased risk factor for adverse maternal health.114
But the surgical burden and risks of overmedicalization have not 
been borne equally by all women. Indeed, there are stark racial and soci-
oeconomic disparities in C-section deliveries, with Black women experi-
encing higher rates of the procedure and its associated health risks.115
These disparities remain even when comorbidities and social demograph-
ic background factors are accounted for.116 One study of New York City 
data found racial disparities in C-sections even after accounting for insur-
ance status, pre-pregnancy weight, maternal age, education, parity, birth 
weight, gestational age, medical complications, and pregnancy complica-
tions, with rates of C-sections for Hispanic Caribbean women and Afri-
can American women still greater compared to the rates for white wom-
en.117 Importantly, the disparity is visible even for low-risk pregnancies, 
i.e., those pregnancies for which there is no medical complication.118 In 
other words, perfectly healthy Black women who do not need a C-
111. See Emma L. Barber, Lisbet S. Lundsberg, Kathleen Belanger, Christian M. 
Pettker, Edmund Funai & Jessica L. Illuzi, Indications Contributing to the Increasing Cesarean 
Delivery Rate, 118 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 29 (2011).
112. See, e.g., Kozhimannil et al., supra note 101, at 527; Eugene Declercq, Fay 
Menacker & Marian MacDorman, Maternal Risk Profiles and the Primary Cesarean Rate in 
the United States, 1991-2002, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 867, 867 (2006).
113. MacDorman et al., Cesarean Birth, supra note 17, Abstract, 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/18456070/ [https://perma.cc/L3L9-DDCH]. 
114. Id. at 302 (noting the nexus between increased risk for neonatal and maternal mor-
tality and medically elective cesareans compared with vaginal births).
115. Azad A. Kabir, Gabriella Pridjian, William C. Steinmann, Eduardo A. Herrera &
M. Mahmoud Khan, Racial Differences in Cesareans: An Analysis of U.S. 2001 National In-
patient Sample Data, 105 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 710, 710 (2005) [hereinafter 
Kabir et al.].
116. Id.
117. T. Janevic, E. Loftfield, D.A. Savitz, E. Bradley, J. Illuzzi & H. Lipkind, Disparities 
in Cesarean Delivery by Ethnicity and Nativity in New York City, 18 MATERNAL & CHILD 
HEALTH J. 250, 250-57 (2013) [hereinafter Janevic et al.].
118. Id. at 252-53.
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section are also receiving this major surgery, thereby increasing their risk 
of negative health outcomes.
Several reasons have been articulated for these disparities. First, pa-
tients’ preferences, specifically Black women’s preferences, are often al-
luded to.119 For example, a study in the Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology
opined that “Black women may have been more agreeable to primary 
cesarean delivery than others.”120 This amounts to a cultural proxy for 
race. In essence, this assumption summarily reduces Black women to a 
homogenous group with a preference for overmedicalization without 
further inquiry.
This rationale is not only counterintuitive—insofar as it is unlikely 
that Black women alone may prefer medically unnecessary, invasive in-
terventions that expose them to greater risks—but it has also been reject-
ed, especially when considering that the disparities exist among first-time 
and low-risk pregnancies.121 Instead, it is more likely that healthy Black 
women are not being presented with freedom of choice when it comes 
to delivery.122
Another particularly harmful explanation is biological racial differ-
ences, which implicates Black women’s bodies in the etiology of under-
lying risk factors that cause C-sections. In the same Obstetrics and Gynecol-
ogy study, researchers controlled for over twenty clinical risk factors, yet
Black women still experienced disproportionately high rates of medically 
unnecessary C-sections.123 Underlying health profiles did not fully explain 
the disparate C-section rates. Thus, the clear implication is that healthy
Black women are likely having unnecessary C-sections, exposing them to 
harmful medical risks and adverse outcomes affecting their health.
The study’s authors attempted to explain the disparities by framing
Black women as somehow biologically different. They suggested Black 
women may have a higher rate of “unreported or uncommon medical 
complications,” prompting physicians’ decisions for C-sections.124 It is not 
clear why Black women alone would experience complications not cap-
tured by a list of common clinical complications, and in numbers that re-
sult in significantly higher C-section rates.
This untenable assumption is characteristic of medicine’s failure to 
confront the reality of racism as a risk factor. It represents a common 
119. E.g., Kabir et al., supra note 115, at 716. 
120. Id.
121. Allison S. Bryant, Sierra Washington, Miriam Kuppermann, Yvonne W. Cheng &
Aaron B. Caughey, Quality and Equality in Obstetric Care: Racial and Ethnic Differences in 
Caesarean Section Delivery Rates, 23 PAEDIATRIC & PERINATAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 454, 460 
(2009) [hereinafter Bryant et al.] 
122. See id.
123. See Kabir et al., supra note 115, at 716.
124. Id.
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mode of framing Black women’s bodies as biologically predisposed to 
complication. Applying this logic then justifies subjecting Black women 
to increased risk management practices; simultaneously, it elides how 
physician and institutional racism construct and frame risk to overmedi-
calize women generally and Black women especially.125 As a result of this 
durable logic, providers approach clinical encounters with “preconceived 
notions of risk of adverse maternal or neonatal outcomes for women of 
different races and ethnicities”—risks they then attempt to mitigate 
through increased interventions.126
By continuing to mark Black women’s bodies as distinct and de-
serving of differential medical treatment, biomedicine evidences a re-
markable “lack of attention to social theory [because of] the persistence of 
implicit notions of race.”127 Indeed, epidemiologists continue to embrace 
a “theory of race that has been rejected in adjacent disciplines.”128 Case in 
point, Blackness is still considered a genetic risk factor for preeclampsia, 
which is indeed higher among African Americans.129
Furthermore, in addition to preexisting biological racial beliefs, pro-
vider bias is also an important contributor to the overmedicalization of 
Black women.130 This phenomenon must therefore be understood as a
125. See BRIDGES, supra note 44, at 112 (“[W]hen physician racism is invoked in studies 
of racial disparities, it is never by that name and it is usually done through a ‘rhetoric of 
exculpation’ and with ‘euphemizing vocabulary’ in which physicians are excused for the 
racial biases they may harbor and put into practice.”). 
126. Bryant et al., supra note 121, at 460.
127. Carles Muntaner, Invited Commentary: Social Mechanisms, Race, and Social Epidemiolo-
gy, 150 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 121, 123 (1999).
128. Id. at 122.
129. Annettee Nakimuli, Olympe Chazara, Josaphat Byamugisha, Alison M. Elliott, 
Pontiano Kaleebu, Florence Mirembe & Ashley Moffett, Pregnancy, Parturition and 
Preeclampsia in Women of African Ancestry, 210 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 510-
20.e1, 514 (2014); J.M. Roberts & D.W. Cooper, Pathogenesis and Genetics of Pre-
Eclampsia, 357 LANCET 53, 54 (2001) (“The list of predisposing factors” for pre-eclampsia 
“includes hypertension, diabetes, increased insulin resistance, increased testosterone, 
[B]lack race, and increased blood homocysteine concentration.” (emphasis added)).
130. BRIDGES, supra note 44, at 111-12 (emphasizing the importance of naming physi-
cian racism in reproductive health discourse); INST. OF MED. COMM. ON 
UNDERSTANDING & ELIMINATING RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE,
UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH 
CARE 11 (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith & Alan R. Nelson eds., 2003) (citing
Kevin A. Schulman, Jesse A. Berlin, William Harless, Jon F. Kerner, Shyrl Sistrunk, Ber-
nard J. Gersh, Ross Dubé, Christopher K. Taleghani, Jennifer E. Burke, Sankey Williams, 
John M. Eisenberg & José J. Escarce, The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians’ Recommenda-
tions for Cardiac Catheterization, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 618, 624-25 (1999) [hereinafter 
Schulman et al.]) (acknowledging the role of physician bias in disparities in quality of care 
and outcomes); Janevic et al., supra note 117, at 256.
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function of both underlying processes of racialization and physician rac-
ism.
Biological race has been discredited as lacking any meaning beyond 
its social and political geneses.131 Yet, as this Essay illustrates, it has re-
mained powerful in shaping Black women’s disparate exposure to surgical 
procedures in obstetrics, where Black women are paradoxically simulta-
neously overmedicalized and medically neglected. Biological race, in 
turn, operates as a justification for Black women’s adverse health out-
comes. As the next Part will illustrate, the discourse on ovemedicaliza-
tion is not only crucial for interrogating racialization in obstetrics but 
power differentiation as well.
III. The Limits of Informed Consent
Clearly, one needn’t look to history to confirm that anti-Black rac-
ism forecloses to Black Americans full access to the panoply of bioethical 
rights—“autonomy, justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence”132—
traditionally enjoyed by others. This Part first examines the doctrine of 
informed consent, its preoccupation with protecting patient autonomy,
and how it operates in actual medical practice. It then deploys the 
frameworks of obstetric racism133 and dehumanization to explore the in-
tersectional dynamics of obstetrics that specifically impair Black women’s 
reproductive autonomy.
A. Informed Consent
Informed consent protects patients’ well-being and enshrines respect 
for their bodies and the right to self-determination.134 When operational-
131. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS,
AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011) (discuss-
ing the resuscitation of biological race in the form of race-based drugs and genetic test-
ing).
132. Osagie K. Obasogie & Marcy Darnovsky, Introduction to BEYOND BIOETHICS:
TOWARD A NEW BIOPOLITICS 1, 6-7 (Osagie K. Obasogie & Marcy Darnovsky eds., 
2018).
133. See Davis, Obstetric Racism, supra note 20.
134. See Informed Consent, AMERICAN CONGRESS OF OBSTETRICIANS &
GYNECOLOGISTS’ COMMITTEE ON ETHICS: COMM. OP. NO. 439, Aug. 2009, at 1, 
https://www.acog.org/-/media/project/acog/acogorg/clinical/files/committee-opinion
/articles/2009/08/informed-consent.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG4P-RD5Q ] [hereinafter 
ACOG Committee Opinion]; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(discussing the relationship between informed consent and the physician’s duty to exercise 
reasonable care for the safety and well-being of the patient); see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 
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ized, it is a process of communication between provider and patient that
produces either affirmative consent or refusal.135 A physician ideally makes 
certain disclosures about the risks and benefits of a particular treatment 
course and responds to patient needs.136 In other words, informed consent 
is more than simply signing a consent form—it is the “mutual sharing of 
information” between the clinician and patient to facilitate the patient’s 
active engagement in their treatment.137
Justice Cardozo’s early articulation of the principle reflected in-
formed consent’s core concern—procuring individual autonomy: “Every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an 
operation without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, from which 
he is liable in damages.”138 The doctrine of informed consent shifted 
throughout the twentieth century, beginning first with the professional or 
physician-based standard, which measured the disclosure requirements 
from the perspective of a reasonable medical practitioner under the same 
or similar circumstances.139 The standard was later criticized for its “exces-
sive paternalism” and the immunity it effectively granted to physician de-
fendants in malpractice cases.140
Lawmakers later expanded the consent requirement’s protections by 
demanding that disclosure be premised on the informational needs of the 
reasonable patient.141 Approximately half of the nation’s jurisdictions now 
adopt a reasonable patient standard due to “broad skepticism that practi-
tioners can adequately police their own professional standards.”142 To sat-
P.2d 1, 9-11 (Cal. 1972) (analyzing the duty of a medical practitioner to obtain a patient’s
informed consent for surgery).
135. ACOG Committee Opinion, supra note 134, at 6.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 1; see also Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical 
Decision-Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 89 
(2010) (describing consent as a process of communication whereby the physician and pa-
tient use “unbiased and complete information on the risks and benefits” of treatment alterna-
tives (emphasis added)).
138. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
139. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93 (stating informed consent is required “except in cases of 
emergency where the patient is unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate before 
consent can be obtained”); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
140. Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experi-
mental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 367 (2002).
141. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
142. Heather Joy Baker, We Don’t Want to Scare the Ladies: An Investigation of Maternal 
Rights and Informed Consent Throughout the Birth Process, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 538, 
545 (2010); Noah, supra note 140, at 368 (“A few other courts opt for a more subjective 
test, which inquires about the perhaps idiosyncratic prior knowledge and preferences of 
the particular patient.”).
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isfy the requirements of informed consent, physicians must now disclose 
information that a reasonable patient would take into account when
making medical decisions, or else they may face liability.143
The leading case on informed consent, Cantebury v. Spence, illus-
trates this reasonable patient standard. In that case, a physician advised a
patient to undergo a laminectomy to alleviate back pain.144 However, the 
physician did not advise him of the well-known 1% chance of becoming 
paralyzed, believing this might cause the patient to reject the treatment.145
Following the procedure, the patient fell from his hospital bed and was 
paralyzed.146 The patient sued the physician for failing to inform him of 
the risks associated with the procedure.147
The D.C. Circuit held that physicians would be liable if their con-
duct was not “reasonable under the circumstances,” but centered that in-
quiry on the disclosure requirements from the requirements from the rea-
sonable patient’s position, not the physician’s.148 This objective standard 
asks whether a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely 
to attach significance to the risks associated with a particular therapy.149 In 
other words, it assesses the informational needs from the perspective of a 
reasonable patient under similar circumstances.
The preceding discussion of Black women’s medical exploitation as 
experimental subjects and their contemporary overmedicalization illus-
trates, inter alia, a failure of informed consent to protect Black women
from medical violence. Despite an emphasis on ‘patient-centered’ care,150
law in practice is often not commensurate with the spirit or letter of the 
law. This disjuncture is referred to as the “informed consent gap,”151
which emanates from “the physician-patient relationship, the tort law 
system, and an increasingly cost-conscious health care delivery system.”152
In obstetrics for example, physicians often practice medicine defensively,
that is, with the constant specter of malpractice liability distorting medical 
143. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
144. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 777.
145. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 777.
146. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 777.
147. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 778. 
148. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 785.
149. Baker, supra note 142, at 545.
150. Moulton & King, supra note 137, at 89-90 (arguing that shared medical decision-
making addresses some of the challenges of balancing patient-centered care with autono-
my). For further discussion on the importance of shared decision-making in ensuring in-
formed consent, see Bryan Murray, Informed Consent: What Must a Physician Disclose to a 
Patient?, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 563 (2012).
151. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903-05 (1994). 
152. Id. at 905.
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treatment recommendations.153 This accounts for much of the rise in in-
vasive interventions such as C-sections, which result from women receiv-
ing clinical advice from providers without being informed of the non-
medical factors behind these recommendations.154 This not only impairs
patients’ decisional capacities, it exposes them to medically unnecessary 
and high-risk interventions primarily to reduce physicians’ legal liability. 
This contributes to the pervasive obstetric violence that routinely exposes 
women to mistreatment and abuse.155 The informed consent gap there-
fore renders obstetrics a precarious terrain for women.
Finally, physician paternalism often renders informed consent illuso-
ry. Physicians are presumed to not only know what is best, but also to be
unbiased and objective in their expertise.156 Patients are likewise social-
ized to trust medical authority and to be ‘good’ patients by placing defer-
ential trust in physicians.157 As a result, providers may influence medical 
decisions without necessarily making an explicit recommendation. Yet, 
despite their claims to objectivity, physicians are not free from the general 
biases of society.158 This is because medicine is a microcosm of wider so-
ciety, where race, gender, and class controls are routinely enacted. These 
are the forces that contribute to obstetric violence.
B. Obstetric Racism
Obstetric violence is pervasive and adversely impacts the reproduc-
tive agency of all pregnant persons. It is increasingly being recognized as 
gender-based violence as women continue to report mistreatment and 
153. See generally MORRIS, supra note 108 (discussing the role of the legal malpractice 
system in the C-section epidemic).
154. Lisa L. Chalidze, Misinformed Consent: Non-Medical Bases for American Birth Recom-
mendations as a Human Rights Issue, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 59, 60 (2010). For more on 
how VBAC bans contribute to this issue, see Kukura, supra note 109, and L. Indra 
Lusero, Challenging Hospital VBAC Bans Through Tort Liability, 20 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 399 (2014) (examining the feasibility of tort claims against hospital VBAC 
bans).
155. Farah Diaz-Tello, Invisible Wounds: Obstetric Violence in the United States, 24 
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 56, 57 (2016).
156. Benjamin, supra note 11, at 978 (describing the false dichotomy in the expert-
layperson duality that “demeans the competency of so-called lay people, while ignoring 
the subjectivity and biases of experts”).
157. Karin A. Martin, Giving Birth Like a Girl, 17 GENDER & SOC’Y 54, 54 (2003) (de-
scribing how white, middle-class, heterosexual women often worry about “being nice, 
polite, kind, and selfless in their interactions during labor and childbirth”).
158. See generally BRIDGES, supra note 44, for a discussion of the effects of racism on
reproductive health. See also John M. Hoberman, Medical Racism and the Rhetoric of Excul-
pation: How Do Physicians Think About Race?, 38 NEW LITERARY HIST. 505, 512 (2007).
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coerced medical interventions during birth.159 The naturalization of phy-
sician authority is key to this phenomenon.
Physicians are generally presumed to possess a monopoly on exper-
tise and their medical authority is rarely questioned.160 Because of physi-
cian paternalism, they are presumed to be better suited to make 
healthcare decisions for patients.161 At the same time, women are social-
ized to distrust their own bodily knowledge and to place deferential trust
in physicians to act in their best interest.162 Indeed, “[p]roviders 
acknowledge that this power differential exists and will persist.”163
Thus, providers can determine how to frame risk, including what in-
formation is shared, controlling how some patients understand their op-
tions.164 As a result, informed consent becomes vacuous, representing 
more of “an illusion of autonomy rather than the real thing,” as providers 
can guide women’s decision-making by the mere framing of treatment 
options and choices.165 In other words, physicians are powerful in shaping 
patient’s choices, which in turn creates a fertile space for obstetric vio-
lence.
As an analytical lens, obstetric violence illuminates the gendered vi-
olence that all women experience; but it does not fully account for “the 
contours of racism that materialize during Black women’s medical en-
counters” with physicians.166 Professor Dána-Ain Davis thus offered the 
theoretical framework of obstetric racism to account for the full effects of 
medical racism and obstetric violence.
There are several points that distinguish Black women’s medical ex-
periences from others. Modern American medicine is anchored in the 
medical exploitation of Black women and African Americans.167 This his-
159. Diaz-Tello, supra note 155, at 57 (citing Eugene R. Declercq, Carol Sakala, 
Maureen P. Corry, Sandra Applebaum & Ariel Herrlich, Major Survey Findings of Listen-
ing to Mothers III: Pregnancy and Birth, 23 J. PERINATAL EDUC. 9 (2014)). Moreover, 
most women (63%) who had a primary C-section, for example, identified their provider 
as the decision-maker. Id.
160. Benjamin, supra note 11, at 979.
161. Molly R. Altman, Talita Oseguera, Monica R. McLemore, Ira Kantrowitz-
Gordon, Linda S. Franck & Audrey Lyndon, Information and Power: Women of Color’s Ex-
periences Interacting with Health Care Providers in Pregnancy and Birth, SOC. SCI. & MED. 7
(2019) [hereinafter Altman et al.].
162. See Ehrenreich, supra note 12, at 493 (illustrating women’s reactions to medical 
care are based on their prior experiences, which are in turn shaped by race).
163. Altman et al., supra note 161.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Davis, Obstetric Racism, supra note 20, at 561.
167. See generally OWENS, supra note 41 (recounting the history of gynecology and its 
basis in medical experiments on enslaved women); WASHINGTON, supra note 16 (re-
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tory cannot be disconnected from Black women’s medical exploitation 
today. Indeed, this is a key feature of Black women’s negotiation with 
obstetrics. The discourse of obstetric racism thus engages with this dis-
tinct history and the continuity of reproductive subordination.168
The discussion above, for example, illustrates that Black women’s 
overmedicalization is an extension of biomedical racialization that began 
with enslaved women. As physiologically distinct “clinical material,” their 
bodies were expendable then to the emerging surgical needs of gynecol-
ogy. Similarly, today, the ‘unexplained’ racial disparities in rates of C-
sections are attributed to “uncommon” biological risk factors specific to 
Black women alone. Put otherwise, the “dystopian past” is “not just the 
past.”169
At the same time, scientific discourses often obscure the significance 
of institutional practices such as overmedicalization in reproductive 
health. Instead, they overemphasize Black women’s bodily characteristics 
as a site of pathologization.
Consider the racial disparities in primary C-section deliveries, for 
example. While African American women are more likely to receive C-
sections than white women,170 researchers emphasize explanations impli-
cating Black women’s individual bodily characteristics, including higher 
rates of obesity and diabetes.171 As this and the previous Part confirm, 
Black women’s disparate exposure to the surgical scalpel is connected to
the logic of biological race and ongoing medical racism—that is, the dis-
tinct causal pathways of obstetric racism that are unique to Black wom-
en.172
Additionally, Black women are not simply harmed by racism; they 
also do not experience the positive reproductive health gains that are tra-
ditionally associated with class mobility. Intersectional analyses, for exam-
ple, illustrate the inability of class mobility to militate against the harmful 
counting the history of Black Americans’ mistreatment as unwitting subjects in medical 
experiments).
168. See Davis, Obstetric Racism, supra note 20; Dána-Ain Davis, Reproducing While Black: 
The Crisis of Black Maternal Health, Obstetric Racism and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 11 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOMED. & SOC’Y ONLINE 56 (2020) [hereinafter Davis, Reproducing 
While Black]. 
169. DÁNA-AIN DAVIS, REPRODUCTIVE INJUSTICE: RACISM, PREGNANCY, AND 
PREMATURE BIRTH 13 (2019).
170. See Getahun et al., supra note 102.
171. Id.
172. Davis, Reproducing While Black, supra note 168, at 60. The other two dimensions 
are “critical lapses in diagnosis” and “being subjected to neglectful, dismissive or disre-
spectful treatment.” Id.
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health effects of racism. 173 To that end, Black women still fare worse than 
their similarly situated white counterparts in maternal morbidity and 
mortality rates even after accounting for socioeconomic class.174
The picture becomes more complex, however, when considering
maternal health disparities are not simply between educated Black wom-
en and their similarly educated white counterparts. Rather, educated Black 
women fare comparatively worse than non-educated white women.175 The 
mortality rate for Black women with a college education or higher is
about 1.6 times greater than that of white women with less than a high
school diploma.176 The positive health effects of advanced socioeconomic 
status thus do not accrue to Black women as they do to white women 
and other ethno-racial groups.
Race has thus been described as an independent organizing princi-
ple; although it interacts with other systems of domination, it has inde-
pendent effects beyond class and gender.177 In the realm of maternal 
health, therefore, Khiara Bridges argues that “race has everything to do 
with why Black women are more likely to die in the path toward moth-
erhood—and not simply because race follows class closely in the United 
States.”178 Indeed, the disparities in maternal health outcomes reflect the 
residual effects of racism that cannot be explained by class. It is therefore 
racism, not biological race, that principally drives Black women’s negative 
health outcomes. 179
Overmedicalization is an important tool for interrogating Black 
women’s negative maternal health outcomes. For Black women especial-
ly, the problem of disparities in maternal health must also be understood 
as a problem of racism intersecting with high-risk practices, not simply the 
problem of high-risk populations.180 Nevertheless, Black women’s bodies 
are often framed as a site of difference, and, by necessity, brokenness. By 
173. Cf. Emily E. Petersen, Nicole L. Davis, David Goodman, Shanna Cox, Carla Syv-
erson, Kristi Seed, Carrie Shapiro-Mendoza, William M. Callaghan & Wanda Barfield, 
Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Pregnancy-Related Deaths—United States, 2007-2016, 68 
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SOCIO. REV. 465, 474-75 (1996).
178. BRIDGES, supra note 44, at 109. 
179. See generally Jo C. Phelan & Bruce G. Link, Is Racism a Fundamental Cause of Ine-
qualities in Health?, 41 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 311 (2015) (“[T]he connection between race 
and health outcomes endures largely because racism is a fundamental cause of racial differ-
ences” in health outcomes.).
180. Schulman et al., supra note 130, at 618 (finding that the race and sex of a patient 
independently influence how physicians manage chest pain).
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emphasizing biological race as a risk factor—or worse, shaming Black 
women for having higher body mass index, hypertension, or being un-
healthy—these pathologizing strategies divert attention away from medi-
cal racism and overmedicalization in producing disparate outcomes.
This discussion on obstetric racism illustrates how medical violence 
harms Black women’s reproductive agency and their health. However, 
with its emphasis on individual agency, the doctrine of informed consent 
does not protect against medical harm to disempowered social groups. 
This is a key critique of the doctrine. As sociologist Ruha Benjamin ex-
plains, “[t]oo often, biomedical and scientific culture and Euro-American 
values of autonomy and free choice elude interrogation.”181 To that 
point, its overemphasis on individual choice “can cloud, even obscure 
and divert our attention away from group harms and the vulnerabilities of 
collectives and communities.”182 The following discussion on dehumani-
zation further demonstrates the inadequacy of modern bioethics to pro-
tect Black women from medical violence.
C. Dehumanization
Black women’s overexposure to the scalpel also implicates another 
axis of obstetric racism—dehumanization. Dehumanization effectively 
reduces patients to clinical objects.183 It does so by depriving them of their 
agency and denying their capacity for full human experiences.184 Thus, it 
assails the body and will.
Psychoanalytic studies of dehumanization suggest that it is distinct 
from traditional prejudice or racism.185 Prejudice is a broad intergroup at-
titude that may prompt one to discriminate against a job candidate, for 
example; dehumanization, by contrast, “is the route to moral exclusion”
and the “denial of basic human protections to a group.”186 Dehumaniza-
tion has, for example, been identified causally in studies on police use of 
force against Black boys who are denied the protective innocence of 
181. Benjamin, supra note 11, at 978.
182. Troy Duster, Foreword to BEYOND BIOETHICS: TOWARD A NEW BIOPOLITICS, su-
pra note 132, at xiii; see also Obasogie & Darnovsky, supra note 132, at 5, 6-7.      
183. Omar Sultan Haque & Adam Waytz, Dehumanization in Medicine: Causes, Solutions, 
and Functions, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCH. SCI. 176, 176 (2012).
184. Id. at 177-78.
185. Phillip Atiba Goff, Marrthew Christian Jackson, Brooke Allison Lewis Di Leone, 
Carmen Marie Culotta & Natalie Ann DiTomasso, The Essence of Innocence: Consequences 
of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 526, 527 (2014).
186. Id.
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childhood: Because they are more likely to be perceived as adults, they 
lose the protections generally afforded to other children.187
It also manifests as apathy to outgroup violence and “decreased con-
cern for harm inflicted on the dehumanized individual or groups.”188
Consider one study of white participants who were subliminally primed 
with images of apes (a traditional mode of dehumanization for Black 
Americans in the U.S.) before watching a video of police beating a Black 
man: The participants were more likely to endorse the beating, despite 
the extremity of the violence, after viewing the dehumanizing images.189
However, the participants did not endorse the same beating when the 
suspect was white or when they had not been primed with the image.190
Dehumanization is a critical aspect of Black women’s medical expe-
riences. Denying Black women’s capacity to feel pain has been a com-
mon form of dehumanization that deprives them of “a critical human ex-
perience based on an arbitrary group marker.”191 Increased awareness of 
the hegemonic perception within medicine that Black Americans feel 
pain differently has exposed the perverse ways in which biological racism 
continues to distort medical practice and perpetuate medical violence.192
This form of dehumanization emanates from the “super-humanization” 
or medical super-body trope193 that continues to legitimize the differential 
treatment of Black bodies.
Overmedicalization might well reflect physician bias or traditional 
prejudice. Indeed, physicians may be more prone to racial animus, and as 
a result, less likely to refer Black women to less invasive or therapeutic 
treatments. The increased surgical attention to Black women’s bodies 
may therefore reflect conscious stereotyping or bias, but it is also a mode 
of dehumanization because it displays apathy to Black women’s physical 
pain and trauma.
187. Id.
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This Part thus sheds light on the institutional forces that mire Black 
women’s navigation of medicine. In particular, biological racism and the 
law have always dictated Black women’s incorporation within biomedi-
cine as objects of power and subordination. These forces continue to ac-
count for the divergence of bioethics principles as imagined in the law 
and as they materialize in practice.
Conclusion
Serena Williams’s experience reveals a sobering truth about child-
birth in the U.S.—that is, how obstetrics can silence and dismiss Black 
women, exposing them to reproductive harm and medical violence.194
Insofar as scientific discourses continue to frame Black women through 
the lens of biological race and as a high-risk population, this Essay coun-
ters the problematization of Black women’s bodies. Instead, it argues that 
medical institutional practices and medical racism are material to Black 
women’s health outcomes.
While Williams had a pre-existing medical condition, which placed 
her arguably in a high-risk category, it was her providers’ refusal to listen 
to her that increased her risk of an adverse maternal outcome. It was this
inability to critically engage with providers—to effectively talk back to 
medical authority—that nearly proved fatal. Had she not been insistent, 
she would likely have been among those women who do not survive 
childbirth. It is this silencing that renders childbirth a fatal terrain for 
many Black women.
Williams’s ability to successfully push back at all speaks to the ex-
ception that confirms the rule. Williams had considerable resources at her 
disposal compared to the average person giving birth—both material and 
informational. These resources matter because they affect one’s ability to 
challenge physician authority and engage in informed refusal at a moment 
of profound vulnerability. Williams was thus able to push back against the 
weight of an oppressive medical apparatus—the hegemony of physician 
paternalism, normalized obstetric violence, and the marginalization of 
women’s bodily expertise. For Black women, this calculus includes a his-
tory of dehumanization, pathologization, and distrust.
Being legally and bioethically empowered means being able to push 
back against these edifices that continue to mar Black women’s bodies.
For some, this might require nothing short of herculean fortitude—an 
untenable and cruel expectation considering the demands on the body 
and will during childbirth. More than anything, the ‘problem’ of Black 
194. Elizabeth A. Howell, Natalia Egorova, Amy Balbierz & Jennifer Zeitlin, Black-
White Differences in Severe Maternal Morbidity and Site of Care, 214 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 122.e1 (2016).
WINTER 2021] The Limits of Informed Consent 75
women’s reproductive health and agency must be understood as that of a 
defective health care system and a legal apparatus that is ill-equipped to 
cure such defect—not defective bodies. Indeed, this discourse must be 
situated within the context of the forces of overmedicalization and ob-
stetric racism, which preclude Black women from accessing not only in-
formed consent, but the full spectrum of reproductive rights.

